"failure to understand Soviet, and evolve own viable armoured doctrine,"

I seriously doubt there was a 'failure' to understand the Soviet doctrine. We understood very well that the Soviets preferred deep battle. We could do the math and knew that every part of the line in NATO would be facing 3-1 odds with the main effort concentrated to 9-1 odds. The M-60 wasn't good enough to stand up to that and that is why we developed a shiney new tank that had used high tech means to improve armor and offensive capabilities without sacrificing mobility. Fast enough to interrupt decision cycles, be places it shouldn't, quickly destroy forces and move on, preserve that vital asset that can't be replaced - the crew.

"the impetus of the Korean War field need, and what I call "Hirler's larst curse", the unwavering faith in the 'magic bullet' solution of wunderwaffe, i.e. that Advanced Technology can solve all warfare problems, and help a smaller force defeat a larger one."

Increased capability for the smaller force is pretty essential if they are not able to rely on terrain to help them.

"The M-1 development therefore followed a somewhat of a strange path, abandoning the evolutionary M-26/48/60 path for what initially was supposed to be the US-German MBT-70, but then each country going its own way."

And just what did it abandon?

"The product for both were unquestioningly heavy tanks that had been designed to improve crew survivability, but did not fit the operational or strategic needs of either the USA or NATO."

How did the Abrams not fit the operational or strategic needs of the US or NATO?

They did however significantly contribute to the GDLS corporate profitability, and continue to be that. The M-1 had been sold only to the Saudis, and also given away at [it is believed] below production costs to the Egyptians. Its design was used as a model by the South Koreans in a lighter package, who are ironically the only country in the World that may really need a heavy tank.

"By the time the US Army arrived in Saudi Arabi, it was fielding a mixture of vehicles designed for different mission profiles during different periods, none designed for the sort of plan that was to be executed to defeat the Iraqi Army. Moreover, the US Army hadn't fought in these climatic conditions arguably since 1942. This is why the Desert Storm had to be executed to end as quickly as possible. There were too many uncertainties about the execution, and the longer the operation progressed, the greater the forces of friction would act on the Coalition forces, potentially causing the prolongation of the conflict that was already costing 'an arm and a leg'."

"The role of the M-1 Abrams fleet in the whole was just one of many over-designed over-engineered platforms and systems that produced the logistic nightmare for the Coalition as a whole. Only Saddam Hussein's stupidity allowed a Coalition victory in February 1991, not any technological advantage or brilliant generalship."